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A recent work ( Herna´ndez et al.12) introduced a networked voting rule supported by a trust-based
social network, where indications of possible representatives were based on individuals opinions.
Individual contributions went beyond a simple vote-counting and were based on proxy voting. These
mechanisms generated a high level of representativeness of the selected committee, weakening the
possibility of relations of patronage. By incorporating the integrity of individuals and its perception,
here we address the question of the trustability of the resulting committee. Our results show that
this voting rule provides high representativeness for small committees with a high level of integrity.
Furthermore, the voting system displays robustness to strategic and untruthful application of the
voting algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
The form of the participation of common people to
contemporary and complex democracies is a central issue
in the social debate. Many transformation and possible
innovation have been recently discussed1–3, often forced
by the widespread use of digital technologies, which re-
design our interactions in politics and society. A gen-
eral problem, which ranges from national to neighbor-
hood scales, is the problem of selecting an exemplary
group of representatives to make decisions on behalf of
the community4–6.
Despite that the theoretical and philosophical debate
over these issues has been prolific7,8, examples of em-
pirical construction of new algorithms have been rela-
tively limited9–12. Recently, Hernandez et al. introduced
a new social algorithm for collective selection of a com-
mittee of representatives12. This algorithm for collective
selection is developed starting from a standard situation
where each voter is allowed to vote for only one candi-
date. However, the elected representatives are the ones
who obtain a better rank among their counterparts, in a
way that individual contributions go far beyond a simple
vote-counting.
The introduced formal algorithm presents new specific
features which could improve legitimation and fairness of
governance. The lists of candidates are not fixed in ad-
vance, but they emerge as a self-organized process con-
trolled by the voting rules. This fact introduces an ef-
fective participation and engagement of the whole com-
munity, in contrast to top-down rigid lists of candidates.
The voters express not preferences, but opinions, which
determine their indications about whom they would like
to see as their representatives. Finally, the new proposed
mechanism improves the representativeness of the com-
mittee, weakening the possibility of relations of patron-
age and clientelism. Additionally, the mechanism of votes
aggregation is supported by a self-declared confidence cir-
cle, which defines a network of trusted individuals. This
trust-based social network, which can be implemented on
an online platform, is a fundamental ingredient that al-
lows for direct accountability of the elected committee.
Even if based on a local network, it can naturally scale to
national sizes, translating to those larger scales an effica-
cious accountability typical of small-sized communities.
In this work, we analyze a new aspect that can be
introduced in the original algorithm. Specifically, we in-
corporate the possibility of a form of direct choice of in-
dividuals over the possible elected representatives. By
doing that, we mitigate the aspect that voters determine
their indications about whom they would like to see as
their representative through opinions, valuing the princi-
ple that individuals directly select candidates. This new
ingredient is implemented by introducing the expression
of a preference among the contact network of individuals.
Preferences act as a weight on the original opinion-based
ranking algorithm in such a way that higher rates for
these preferences are assigned to individuals considered
more apt to participate in the committee.
The previous mechanism improves the legitimation,
fairness, and effectiveness of the committee. In fact, over-
laps, which are not controlled by voters, are weighted by
a term subjectively assigned by the individuals. This
weight should encourage a check on incompetence and
corruption. Incompetence because an equal say for every
individual is not necessarily always desired. Corruption
as the preference should be proportional to the person
who demonstrates and promises true integrity: sound
ethical principles and trust. As each voter knows their
representatives and each committee member knows to
whom he is accountable, this fact will allow a strong con-
trol over representatives’ actions.
The purpose of this work is to present and characterize
in depth the new social algorithm throughout computa-
tional analyses. In Sec. II we describe the details of the
algorithm. Sec. III is devoted to test the new voting
rule, modeling the behavior of the selected committee.
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2The quality of the elected committee is assessed looking
at how much their final decisions are consistent with the
personal opinions of the community and estimating the
general integrity of the elected committee. Finally, Sec.
IV presents some discussions of our results and conclud-
ing remarks.
II. THE MODEL
Let us assume a system composed by Ne electors in-
teracting on an internet-based platform. The platform
allows the voters to declare who belongs to their interac-
tion circle, which renders a network of well-known indi-
viduals. Voters also declare their perception of integrity
for each individual k belonging to their interaction circle.
This perception is condensed in a scalar value Ijk ∈ [0, 1],
which represents the perception that individual j has
about the integrity of individual k.
In a following step, voters manifest their opinions on
Ni issues. Issues are organized in questions which can be
defined by a committee or by means of a self-organized
process internal to the community. The answers of each
individual j are organized in a vector vj , composed by
Ni cells. Each cell assume the value 1 for a positive an-
swer, −1 for a negative one or 0 for a question left unan-
swered. Given the previous steps, the representative of a
given individual j is selected by means of the following
algorithm.
We compute the vector’s overlap of each individ-
ual j with all his neighbors k through the following
expression12:
vj ∗ vk =
∑Ni
m=1(v
j
m · vkm)δ(vjm, vkm)∑Ni
m=1(v
j
m · vkm)2
, (1)
where the numerator counts the number of questions an-
swered in the same way (only yes or not) and the denom-
inator counts the number of questions answered simulta-
neously by both individuals; δ stands for the Kronecker
delta which is 1 if vjm = v
k
m and 0 otherwise. Then, we
calculate the product of the previously defined overlap
with the variable Ijk (i.e., the integrity of k as perceived
by j), obtaining the ranking function:
Rjk = Ijk (v
j ∗ vk) . (2)
The introduction of the term Ijk establishes a form of
direct choice of the individual j over the possible elected
representative. In fact, overlaps, which are not controlled
by voters, are weighted by a term subjectively assigned
by the individuals. Note that we are simply considering
the term Ijk and not any possible statistical measure of
the different Ijk associated to each agent k. In this way,
we are clearly loosing information but the main goal of
this study is to describe the effects of a subjective term
on the voting rule and not to obtain a more efficient vot-
ing rule in detecting the best representatives. Finally,
each individual j will indicate as her representative the
individual k′ for which Rjk′ is maximum. In the case
where the same maximum value is shared by more than
one individual, the one with a higher connectivity is se-
lected as the representative. For the exceptional case of
equal connectivity, the representative is randomly chosen
between the equivalent ones.
After the selection of the representative k′ for every
voter j, the final step consists of choosing the aggregate
of representatives of the entire community. To this end,
we construct a directed graph, which we call the repre-
sentative graph, where a node represents each individual
and a directed link connects the individual with her per-
sonal representative. In this graph, which in general is
composed by different disconnected clusters, cycles are
present. These cycles represent individuals that have
been mutually indicated by themselves. In details, we can
affirm that the representative graph is a directed graph
with out-degree 1. It is made of some disconnected com-
ponents each one formed by a cycle with trees attached
to the cycle nodes (see Figure 1). As all the individuals
outside the cycles are represented by the individuals be-
longing to them, individuals who belong to cycles are the
proper potential representatives for the community.
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FIG. 1. Schematic representation of the vote process. Nodes
stand for the individuals; the red ones belong to a cycle and
will be confirmed as representatives if they collect more votes
that the established threshold. The big numbers associated
to the nodes represent the received cumulated votes. Arrows
stand for the indication of each individual and the small num-
bers associated to them represent the number of transferred
votes. Dotted arrows belong to a cycle, where there is no
cumulative transfer of votes.
As a final step, among the individuals belonging to a
cycle, only the ones with a number of votes larger than
a threshold Θ are indicated as representatives. Votes are
counted considering the cumulative flow defined by the
directed graph. If the individual j is pointing to z, z
receives all the votes previously received by j plus one.
This flow of votes is computed only following links outside
the cycles. Inside the cycles, only the single vote of an
individual is counted. To sum up, the votes v received
3by an individual i inside a cycle are equal to:
vi = 1 +
∑
t∈G(i)
lt (3)
where G(i) is the set of all the trees ending at node i
and lt is the number of links of the tree t. Based on
this score, the number of representatives is reduced and
results to be a fraction of the total number of individuals
that belongs to the cycles.
III. RESULTS
In our simulations, each individual is assigned an in-
trinsic integrity ik which is a number uniformly dis-
tributed in the interval [0, 1]. The perceived integrity
Ijk corresponds to ik shifted by the error in the percep-
tion that individual j have on the integrity of individual
k, which is modeled by a scalar δij,k drawn from a Gaus-
sian distribution N(0, σp). In order to keep Ijk ∈ [0, 1],
Ijk values greater than 1 are set to 1 and negative values
are set to 0: Ijk = max[min(ik + δij,k, 1), 0]. On the
other hand, the individuals’ opinions in relation to the
selected issues are randomly generated with the follow-
ing rule: given an issue i, an individual does not have an
opinion (vi = 0) with probability 1/3. The probability
to have an opinion vi = +1(−1), is 1/3 + i (1/3 − i),
where i is a random variable following a normal distri-
bution with mean value equal to zero and σ2 = 0.05.
The interaction circle of each individual is modeled
generating a network where nodes represent individuals
and links the social relationships present in the commu-
nity. The interaction circle of an individual is obtained
selecting a node and considering its first neighbors. Note
that an important simplification of this approach is the
fact that it generates individuals with symmetric social
relationships. In the following analysis three types of net-
works are considered. Homogeneous random networks,
implementing the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model13, where the degree
distribution is peaked around a typical value 〈k〉; hetero-
geneous networks, using the Barabasi-Albert model14,
with a power-law degree distribution P (k) ∝ k−3; and
the so-called small-world Watts and Strogatz network
model15. Our aim is not to model specific aspects of a real
social network, but to use simple examples just to discuss
the possible influence of some relevant network proper-
ties (such as the heterogeneity in the degree distribution,
the average degree and the small-world property), on the
behavior of our model.
The system can be characterized by three observables:
• The normalized committee size, which is the ratio
between the number of elected individuals (E) and
the total number of individuals of the community:
F = E/Ne.
• The representativeness R, which is measured cal-
culating the fraction of decisions expressed by the
F
10 -6 10 -4 10 -2 10 0
10 -2
10 -1
10 0
1-
R
F
10 -3 10 -2 10 -1
10 -2
10 -1
10 0 N  =20
N  =40
N  =80
N  =160
N  =320
i
i
i
i
i
1-
R
F
0 0.01 0.02
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
N  =20
N  =40
N  =80
N  =160
N  =320
i
i
i
i
i
R
F
10 -3 10 -2 10 -1
I
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
N  =20
N  =40
N  =80
N  =160
N  =320
i
i
i
i
i
FIG. 2. Top: On the left, logarithmic plot of 1−R versus nor-
malized committee size for the NV R proposed in12 (dark blue
points) and the one proposed here (NV RI , light blue points)
with Ni = 40. On the right, 1 − R versus normalized com-
mittee size for different Ni values. Bottom: Representativity
(left) and Mean Commitee Integrity (right) as a function of
normalized committee size. We consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi net-
work with Ne = 10000, 〈k〉 = 40 and σ2 = σ2p = 0.05 .Results
are averaged over 100 different realizations.
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FIG. 3. Logarithmic plot of 1 − R versus normalized com-
mittee size (left). Mean Commitee integrity as a function
of normalized committee size (right), for different numbers
of electors Ne. We consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with
Ne = 10000, Ni = 40 and σ
2 = σ2p = 0.05. Results are
averaged over 100 different realizations.
elected committee (ej) which matches with the
community decisions (cj) over all the considered
Ni issues: R =
∑Ni
j=1 δ(ej−cj)
Ni
. The decisions of
the elected committee are attained by means of a
majority vote where each representative’s vote is
weighted by the numbers of popular votes he col-
lected during the election procedure. The commu-
4nity decision correspond to the result of a plebiscite,
where every individual votes following the opinion
expressed in his vector vj (no opinion corresponds
to abstention). For R = 1 a perfect representa-
tiveness is obtained: a committee makes all the
decisions in line with the popular will. On the op-
posite, for binary decisions, R = 1/2 corresponds
to a non-representative committee, whose decisions
are completely uncorrelated to the popular will. A
useful observable is 1 − R, which measures how
far the system is from the perfect representative-
ness. This quantity is particularly interesting be-
cause, for the original model without integrity12, it
presents a simple and robust relation with F :
1−R ∝ 1/
√
F (4)
• The integrity I which is the mean value of the
intrinsic integrity ik of the individuals selected for
the committee.
We perform our analysis varying the value of the
threshold Θ, such as to obtain committees of relatively
small size but which express a high level of representa-
tiveness - close to 0.9 - (see12 for details). In order to
explore the relation between committee size and repre-
sentativeness we plot the representativeness versus the
normalized committee size. As can be clearly appreciate
in the logarithmic plot of 1 − R versus the normalized
committee size, F (Figure 2), the introduction of the in-
tegrity parameter has a marginal impact on the relation
4, which is conserved also after the introduction of the
selection of the individuals’ integrity. Only for higher
values of F , which are unpractical, a slightly worse rep-
resentativeness in relation to the classical algorithm can
be perceived. As for the classical algorithm, for fixed R,
the normalized committee size increases if the number
of issues is increased. The integrity behavior as a func-
tion of F has a quite simple response: it shows very high
values and a final abrupt drop for large committee size,
because, in this situation, the probability for lower in-
tegrity individuals to obtain the amount of votes needed
to be elected become relevant. The dependence on Ni is
weak and establishes a tradeoff between Representativity
and Integrity. More issues make the overlap less relevant
in the computation of Rik improving the integrity at the
expenses of the representativity.
The dependence of the above observables with the sys-
tem size Ne (Figure 3) shows that the latter has an im-
pact on the representativeness but not on the integrity
behavior. In fact, as it was the case in the original model,
when fixing R the committee size decreases for larger sys-
tem sizes. For example, for the parameters used in Figure
3, a representativity of 0.9 corresponds to a committee
of 78 members for a community of 2500 individuals, and
to 36 representatives for Ne = 40000. Furthermore, as
can be seen in Figure 4, the error in the perception of the
integrity, which is controlled by the parameter σp, has no
F
10 -3 10 -2 10 -1
10 -2
10 -1
100
1-
R
m2ȡ = 0.025
m2ȡ = 0.050
m2ȡ = 0.100
m2ȡ = 0.200
m2ȡ = 0.400
F
10 -3 10 -2 10 -1
I
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
p
0.2 0.4 0.6
I
=
F
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.
00
5
m
A B
FIG. 4. Logarithmic plot of 1−R versus normalized commit-
tee size (left). Mean Commitee Integrity as a function of nor-
malized committee size (right). In the inset we show the linear
behaviour of IF=0.005 with σp (IF=0.005 = −0.34σp + 0.98).
We consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with Ne = 10000, Ni =
40, σ2 = 0.05 and 〈k〉 = 40. Results are averaged over 100
different realizations.
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FIG. 5. Top: Logarithmic plot of 1 − R versus normalized
committee size (left) and Mean Commitee Integrity as a func-
tion of normalized committee size (right) for different values
of 〈k〉. Bottom: Logarithmic plot of 1 − R versus normal-
ized committee size (left) and Mean Commitee Integrity as
a function of normalized committee size (right) for different
network topologies. We consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with
Ni = 40, 〈k〉 = 40 and σ2 = σ2p = 0.05. Results are averaged
over 100 different realizations.
effect on the representativeness. In contrast, it obviously
affects the committees’ integrity. The plateaux values
of I decrease with σp, following a simple linear depen-
dence on this parameter. Higher values of errors in the
integrity perception linearly correspond to worse values
in the integrity selection (see inset in Figure 4).
In Figure 5, we can see that the representativeness is
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FIG. 6. Top: Representativity versus normalized committee
size (left), logarithmic plot of 1−R versus normalized commit-
tee size (right). Bottom: Mean Commitee integrity as a func-
tion of normalized committee size (left) and Representativ-
ity (right). The results correspond to the Networked Voting
Rule (NV RI), the Traditional Majority Voting (TMV ) and
a Perfect Voting Rule (PV R) with parameters Ne = 10000,
Ni = 40 and σ
2 = σ2p = 0.05. For the NV RI we use a Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi network with 〈k〉 = 40. For the TV R we set the initial
number of candidates Nc = 100. Results are averaged over
100 different realizations. See the main text for a detailed
explanations of the voting rules.
not strongly dependent on the connectivity of the net-
work. For sufficient high 〈k〉, the curves show the same
behaviors. The heterogeneity in the degree distribution
of the network marginally impacts the results. For high
values of F , the Barabasi-Albert network performs mod-
erately worse than the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi one. As in the case
of the original algorithm, higher connectivity generates
a small bias in the selection of the more representative
individuals. In contrast, the small world property of
the Watts-Strogatz network positively influences the al-
gorithm allowing slightly better results in terms of rep-
resentativeness. This last behavior is more pronounced
than in the case of the original algorithm.
An important analysis is the comparison of our model
behavior with other traditional methods of representa-
tives selection. To this end, we compare theoretically the
representativeness and the integrity of committees of the
same size. A first widespread model is a traditional ma-
jority voting rule (TMV) for electing representatives in
a closed list of previously determined candidates. In our
implementation, a list of Nc candidates is randomly se-
lected among the community and each individual j votes
for the candidate who presents the higher Rjk∗ value (k
∗
belongs to the list of Nc candidates). Note that also
in this case the evaluation of the integrity is influenced
by errors in the perception. Decisions are taken with
the same weighted voting rule. This modeling approach
mimics a voter who has a perfect knowledge of the can-
didates, and it assumes that he makes a rational decision
to maximize his representation. Also for this voting rule,
representativeness is computed by comparing the deci-
sions taken by the committee, obtained with a weighted
majority voting process, with the results of the direct
popular vote. As can be appreciated in Figure 6, our
model is by far more efficient, reducing the size of the
committees in more than a half and showing a better
selection of the integrity of the representatives.
Finally, we compare our method to an idealized perfect
voting rule (PVR). This rule represents a situation of ra-
tional individuals that have a perfect knowledge of all the
other individuals, which means that they perfectly know
the opinion of all the other individuals. Moreover, they
are globally networked, which means that they have a
direct access to all other individuals, allowing their acts
to be checked. In this situation, a voter indicates the
individual that has the higher overlap with his opinion
vector and the best integrity (the higher Rjk∗ value).
Note that in this case the evaluation of the integrity is
not influenced by errors in the perception. The selected
committee is formed by the first F ·Ne individuals which
poll more. Also in this case, the committee decisions
are taken by means of a weighted majority vote. This
voting rule, although unrealistic, is still useful, at least,
in two respects. First, very small communities can ex-
hibit similar characteristics. Second, the model is a useful
yardstick for evaluating the levels of representativeness of
other more realistic models. The relation between repre-
sentativeness and committee sizes can be compared also
in the case of the PVR rule (see Figure 6). It is quite
impressive that the representativeness of our networked
voting rule is comparable with the perfect one. The PVR
rule is able to select a committee with a higher integrity
score, but this is possible because in this situation in-
tegrity of everybody is tested, and not only the integrity
of a small subset, as it happens for our networked rule.
We conclude our analysis testing the resilience of our
networked voting rule to possible attacks. We consider
the situation in which a group of voters decides to as-
sign high Ijk scores to some individuals who, in contrast,
are characterized by a low personal integrity. This be-
havior can model relations of patronage and clientelism,
where individuals with low integrity organize a network
of social relationships for obtaining political support. In
our model this behavior can be modeled introducing a
percentage of individuals p for whom Ijk = 1 − Ijk. As
can be seen in Figure 8, representativeness is not seri-
ously affected by this actions. In contrast, the integrity
of the elected committee is obviously strongly influenced
by this ill behavior. As can be clearly seen fixing a value
for F , integrity undergoes an abrupt transition from high
values towards very low values as p increases.
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FIG. 7. Top: Representativity versus normalized committee
size (left), Mean Committee integrity as a function of normal-
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FIG. 8. Mean Commitee Integrity for a normalized committee
size F = 0.005 (IF=0.005) as a function of the percentage of in-
dividuals with a distorted perception of the integrity (p). We
consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with Ne = 10000, 〈k〉 = 40
and σ2 = σ2p = 0.05. Results are averaged over 100 different
realizations.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed a new voting algorithm, particularly well
suited for online social networks, for selecting a commit-
tee of representatives with the aim of enhancing the par-
ticipation of a community both as electors and as rep-
resentatives. This voting system is based on the idea of
transferring votes through a path over the social network
(proxy-voting systems). Votes are determined by an algo-
rithm which weights the similarity of individuals opinions
and the trust between individuals directly connected in
a specific social network.
Our computational analyses suggest that this voting
algorithm can generate high representativeness for rel-
atively small committees characterized by a high level
of integrity. Results of representativeness and integrity
are comparable with a theoretically defined perfect vot-
ing rule and, in general, they perform better than a
traditional voting rule with a closed list of candidates.
The introduction of a term which expresses the trust on
the integrity of a candidate does not significantly impact
the representativeness of the committee, in particular for
small and medium size committees. The rule shows a
robust behavior in relation to the community size. Be-
sides, the perception of individual integrity directly in-
fluences the quality of the committee: higher values of
errors in the integrity perception linearly correspond to
poorer values in the committees’ integrity. On the other
hand, representativeness is not strongly influenced by in-
tegrity perception.
Interestingly enough, these findings are not strongly
dependent on the general properties of the network used
to describe the community of voters, as shown by the
analysis of networks characterized by different topolo-
gies. Finally, the voting system seems robust to strategic
and untruthful application of the voting algorithm. In
fact, even with a 20% of the votes produced by indi-
viduals which vote for candidates with a low personal
integrity, the integrity of the committee is substantially
unaltered and only if unfair votes are around 40% of the
votes an abrupt change is observed. In conclusion, we
believe that the voting rule here exposed, which fixes a
particular way for the voters to express their preferences
and defines a clear algorithm for determining the final
identification of the committee, could be implemented in
practice. If our results are confirmed in such hypothetical
real scenario, the algorithm discussed here will define an
efficient form of democracy by delegation based on proxy
voting11, which robustly shows high level of representa-
tiveness and integrity of the selected committee.
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